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Chapter 1 
Social representations: a revolutionary paradigm? 
 
Gordon Sammut, Eleni Andreouli, George Gaskell and Jaan Valsiner 
 
Against the prevailing view that progress in science is characterised by the 
progressive accumulation of knowledge, Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of 
scientific revolutions introduced the idea of revolutionary paradigm shifts.  For Kuhn, 
everyday science is normal science in which scientists are engaged in problem solving 
set in the context of a widely accepted paradigm that comprises a broad theoretical 
framework, an agreement on researchable phenomena and on the appropriate 
methodology. But, on occasions normal science throws up vexing issues and 
anomalous results. In response, some scientists carry on regardless, while others begin 
to lose confidence in the paradigm and to look to other options - rival paradigms. As 
more and more scientists switch allegiance to the rival paradigm, the revolution 
gathers pace, supported by the indoctrination of students through lectures, academic 
papers, and textbooks. In response to critics, including Lakatos who suggested that 
Kuhn’s depiction reduced scientific progress to mob psychology, Kuhn himself 
offered a set of criteria that contributed to the apparent ‘gestalt switch’ from the old to 
the new paradigm. But that is another story, as indeed is Kuhn’s claim that the social 
sciences are pre-paradigmatic, i.e. that the only consensus is that there is no 
consensus. 
Yet, consider this paragraph from a leading theorist of social psychology, 
Michael Billig (1991, pp.57-58): 
  “One of the most important recent developments in European social 
psychology has been the emergence of the concept of social representations. 
The emergence of a new concept does not always indicate the formulation of a 
new idea. Sometimes in social psychology a concept is created to describe a 
novelty of experimental procedure, and sometimes to accord scientific 
pretentions to a well-known truism. By contrast, what has characterized the 
concept of social representations has been the intellectual ambition of its 
adherents. They have announced an intellectual revolution to shift social 
psychology to the traditions of European social science. Serge Moscovici, who 
has been both the Marx and Lenin of this revolutionary movement, has 
advocated a fundamental reorientation of social psychology around the concept 
of social representations. This revolution, if successful, will affect both pure and 
applied social psychology. In fact, the whole discipline will become more 
applied in the sense that the emphasis will be shifted from laboratory studies, 
which seek to isolate variables in the abstract, towards being a social science, 
which examines socially shared beliefs, or social representations, in their actual 
context. According to Moscovici, this reorientation would transform the 
discipline into an ‘anthropological and a historical science’ (1984, p. 948)”. 
 
Even without Kuhn’s blessing, this statement points to social representations as 
a paradigm shift – a change in the intellectual agenda and scope of the discipline of 
social psychology; a more catholic approach to research methods, and a movement 
towards the study of social phenomena in context. (Branco & Valsiner, 1997). 
Psychology is in dire need of a transformation in its methodology to live up to science 
– a new science of the processes of human being (Valsiner, 2014).  
In this introduction we explore the origins of social representations theory, the 
theory’s foundational concepts, and recent developments in theorising and 
researching social representations. There is a great intellectual richness in that realm 
of knowledge. Since Moscovici’s original work, the field has been an arena for  
interdisciplinary scholarship.  
 
Locating the social representations approach 
 
For a long time the discipline of psychology has had at its central focus the study of 
human behaviour. The research agenda fashioned by the early behaviourists is 
nowadays somewhat obsolete, yet the quest for explaining human behaviour still 
permeates the discipline today. The notion that all it takes for human beings to behave 
in one way or another is positive or negative reinforcement is by and large accepted as 
a simplistic explanation of human behaviour. Interestingly, the core concept of 
“behaviour” is taken for granted in that tradition – questions about whether non-
observed human acts of conduct (e.g. a person’s decision to act in a socially non-
approved way being inhibited by his/her moral norms) can qualify as “behaviour” 
have not been asked, nor answered. Human conduct is replete with such inhibited 
(=non-occurring) “behaviours” – hence the behaviourist track misses many relevant 
psychological phenomena. 
This paradox—the indeterminacy of what is “behaviour”? —is not new (see 
also Wagner, this volume).  The early critics of the behaviourist approach are 
nowadays cited as classical authors due to the impetus they provided the discipline in 
the search for alternative explanations of human conduct. Most notably, the 
Gestaltists rejected behaviourist explanations and introduced the idea that the human 
mind imposes meaning on sensory stimuli. Consequently, in advancing explanations 
for human behaviour it is necessary to consider cognitive processes that lead to the 
perception of a stimulus. Cognitive processing determines which stimuli are attended 
to, how they are perceived, and how that information is translated into behaviour. The 
historical outcome of this criticism was that the study of cognition took centre stage 
over the study of behaviour in defining the psychological agenda. Characteristic 
explanations of human conduct today typically investigate an extensive list of 
independent variables (i.e. stimuli) that determine, when they all come together in 
characteristic ways, certain behavioural responses (i.e. dependent variables). 
The Gestaltists’ critique of behaviourism (Asch, 1952) provided the foundations 
for the cognitive approach to psychology, which dominates the discipline today. Yet, 
the Gestaltist critique was not the only critique to be levelled at the behaviourist 
approach to psychology. Nor was the influence of some of their core ideas limited to 
the cognitive school. Other critiques levelled at the behaviourist approach were socio-
cultural or socio-political in nature (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Harré & Secord, 
1972; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Billig, 1987). In essence, this criticism was based on 
three core tenets. Firstly, how human beings interpret the events and understand their 
social and physical surroundings depends fundamentally on the cultural and political 
context in which they are embedded. Secondly, human beings are agentic. Their 
actions are not merely behavioural responses; rather, human action is volitional, 
purposive, and meaningful. Thirdly, humans are inherently social. That is, their 
psychological activity is oriented towards others in a systemic way. When people 
come together they do not merely aggregate; they form social groups (Lewin, 1936) 
within which they function in line with the group’s norms, purposes and goals.  
Like the Gestalist, social constructionist, discursive, rhetorical and sociocultural 
approaches to psychology, the social representations approach is faithful to these core 
tenets. It further adds a component to the understanding of human behaviour by way 
of social representations. In Moscovici’s (1984a) own diagrammatic formulation, 
social representations frame S-R responses, in that a stimulus is understood as a 
certain stimulus warranting a certain response according to a social representation that 
describes the event in an intelligible way for the human subject, given the conditions  
in which they find themselves (Wagner, 1993). This notion has led to the social 
representations approach emerging as a countervailing paradigm in psychology (Farr, 
1996). According to Himmelweit (1990), it presents a molar view of human activity 
that is temporally extended in space and time, as opposed to the molecular view of 
considering human behaviour in discrete terms. In other words, for a given stimulus to 
elicit a given response, a social representation must associate that particular stimulus 
with a particular response in an intelligible way for the human subject. To give an 
example, for somebody to call the police when hearing a gunshot, a social 
representation of law and order prohibiting the use of guns is required. In certain 
cultural contexts, or indeed in certain situations, a different social representation 
might be at play that would lead to a different behavioural outcome. For instance, one 
might respond very differently to hearing a gunshot at a military parade. The 
difference between the two situations that leads to an expected difference in 
behavioural responses is the intelligibility of the social situation from the respondent’s 
point of view. The social representations approach thus brings a focus on meaning 
making processes and the intelligibility of situations in understanding human 
psychological activity. 
 
 
Rationale and origins 
 
The social representations approach traces its roots to Durkheim’s (1924) distinction 
between individual representations and collective representations. Durkheim 
discarded the former in favour of the latter in his efforts to understand collective ways 
of life that determined custom and practice in particular societies. The distinction 
remained in Moscovici’s (2008[1961/1976]) original postulation of social 
representations in his investigation of the meanings of psychoanalysis in France. 
Moscovici argued, however, that it was more pertinent to speak of social, rather than 
collective representations, due to the plurality of representations that exist in 
contemporary public spheres (Jovchelovitch, 2007; also Jovchelovitch & Priego-
Hernandez, this volume). This condition is termed cognitive polyphasia and refers to 
the co-existence of different and potentially incommensurable representations within 
the same public, or indeed, the same individual. Collective representations in the 
Durkheimian sense are hegemonic. Moscovici noted that different social 
representations of psychoanalysis circulated in the same public sphere in France. He 
went on to distinguish between hegemonic representations that are similar to 
collective representations in that they are shared by all members of a highly structured 
group; emancipated representations that are characteristic of subgroups who create 
their own versions of reality; and polemical representations that are marked by 
controversy (Moscovici, 1988). The central idea here is that a social group develops 
some intelligible understanding of certain aspects of reality that comes to inform the 
various perspectives of the members of that group. Individual members of the group 
thus come to see the world around them, or certain salient social events, in group-
characteristic ways. The meaning of things in our environment is thus not a given of 
the things themselves. Rather, it is ‘represented’ as a forged understanding between 
social subjects oriented to the same social phenomenon.  
Meaning making is therefore an imperative concern in the social representations 
approach. Social representations have been defined as systems of values, ideas and 
practices that serve to establish social order and facilitate communication (Moscovici, 
1973). They arise in an effort to make the unfamiliar familiar (Moscovici, 1984a). In 
this way they enable the achievement of a shared social reality. On the one hand, they 
conventionalise objects, persons and events by placing them in a familiar context. On 
the other hand, they serve to guide meaningful social interaction (Sammut & 
Howarth, 2014). The social representations approach has thus become a primary 
method for studying common-sense in different social and cultural groups. Rather 
than judging a group’s ways by the normative code of one’s own sociocultural group, 
researchers adopt the social representations approach to gain insight into the system 
of knowledge (common-sense) that justifies certain human practices. 
 
 
A formal model 
As interest in social representations grew through the 1990s, challenges were heard  
 
about the vagueness of the concept – what is the precise definition of a social  
 
representation and what are the appropriate methods for studying them?   
 
Bauer & Gaskell (1999) identify three defining characteristics of representations - the 
cultivation in communication systems; structured contents that serve various functions 
for the communication systems; and their embodiment in different modes and 
mediums. In social milieus, systems of communication (representations) evolve and 
circulate. This is referred to as the process of symbolic cultivation. Representations 
are embodied in one or more of four modes: habitual behaviour, individual cognition, 
informal and formal communication.  
The minimal system involved in representation is the triad: two persons (subject 
1 and subject 2) who share a concern with an object (O). The triangle of mediation [S-
O-S] is the basic unit for the elaboration of meaning. Meaning is not an individual or 
private affair, but always implies the ‘other’. While individually cognised, in form, 
function and content, the presence of the ‘other’ is always implicated on the basis of 
past social experience. To this triangle of mediation, a time dimension, capturing the 
past and the future, is added to denote the project (P) linking the two subjects and the 
object. The project links S1 and S2 through mutual interests, goals and activities. 
Within this project the common sense meaning of the object is an emergent property 
similar to a socialized form of the Lewinian life space (Lewin, 1952). The basic unit 
of analysis is now (S-O-P-S) and is depicted as a ‘toblerone’ – see Figure 1.  
 
 
	  
Figure 1. The toblerone model of social representations 
 
The elongated triangle, the shape of the Swiss chocolate bar, depicts the 
triangular relations in the context of time. In this way, a representation is a time-
gestalt of ‘inter-objectivity’. A section through the toblerone at any particular time is 
a surface that denotes the common sense meaning [the representation] of that object at 
that time. The toblerone model is at the heart of Bauer and Gaskell’s (2002) analysis 
of the ‘biotechnology movement’ – a social psychology of new technology drawing 
upon twenty five years of societal assimilation and accommodation to the science of 
life. 
A final extension of the formal model is the differentiation of social groups 
(windrose model) (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008; also Bauer this volume). Groups are not 
static, they evolve over time – growing, dividing and declining.  Thus over time it is 
likely that various triangles of mediation emerge and coexist in the wider social 
system, characterised at different times by conflict, cooperation, or indifference.  
In this vein, a social system is a pack of toblerones with O as the link between 
different representations – the common referent. A section through the toblerone pack 
denotes the different common senses that exist in different social groups. The 
elongation of the triangles denotes how representations change over time. Equally, 
over time ‘O’ may change due to its own dynamics [material process], or in response 
to common senses [representations]. 
This concept of triangles of mediation brings into focus social milieus or natural 
groups formed around different projects. As Moscovici (2008[1961/1976]) shows, the 
meaning of an object (psychoanalysis) appeared in different forms in the different 
French milieus. In this sense common projects, we-cognitions, collective memories 
and actions, define a functioning social group. 
Social representations are systems of knowledge, or forms of common-sense, 
that human subjects draw upon to make sense of the world around them and act 
towards it in meaningful ways. Social representations, therefore, are social inasmuch 
as they are never idiosyncratic. If they were, they would be incomprehensible to 
others. According to Wagner and Hayes (2005), what marks ‘social’ representations is 
that their meaning is holomorphic, that is, for a given social group the meaning 
attributed to a certain object or event is consistent. 
 
 
Communication 
 
Communication plays a critical role in the production and circulation of social 
representations, as ideas concerning social objects and events circulate in public and 
are incorporated in social representations. Chryssides et al. (2009) have drawn a 
useful distinction between ‘social representation’ and ‘social re-presentation’ to 
address some ambiguity concerning the term. The former refers to the content 
described in a social representation by which an object or event is identified as a 
matter of fact object or event for a particular social group. The latter refers to a 
process of contestation by which newer meanings are proposed in a process of re-
presentation that serves to change aspects of the content of a given social 
representation. The distinction is one between product and process. The latter is 
essentially a communicative exercise of meaning making amongst members of a 
social group. Communication guides both the production and the evolution of social 
representations over time (Sammut, Tsirogianni & Wagoner, 2012).  
Moscovici (1984a) has identified two processes that serve the production of 
new social representations. Anchoring refers to a process of classification by which 
the new and unfamiliar is placed within a familiar frame of reference. The meaning of 
a new object or event is thus anchored to an existing social representation. 
Objectification is a process of externalisation by which the meaning of an object or 
event is projected into the world through images or propositions. New concepts, ideas, 
or events can be objectified in intelligible ways for the purpose of facilitating meaning 
making. For example, images of scientists inoculating tomatoes have served to 
objectify biotechnology and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in certain 
publics (Wagner & Kronberger, 2001).  
Communication thus plays a central role in the production of new social 
representations to make sense of new things and events that enter everyday life. It also 
plays a central role in how social representations circulate in public. In his study of 
the social representations of psychoanalysis in France, Moscovici (2008[1961/1976]) 
identified three communicative strategies that perpetuated the social representations 
of distinct groups. Propaganda is a centralised and ideological form of 
communication that perpetuates a social reality defined for a group in political terms. 
Propagation is a communicative exercise founded on belief dictated by a central 
authority. Diffusion is the least circumscribed communicative genre and allows for a 
diversity of opinions based on scepticism and the questioning of consensus. Different 
groups may be more or less open to alternative constructions of the object or event in 
question by other individuals and groups. Consequently, they adopt characteristic 
patterns of communication that serve to perpetuate their own versions. 
The role of communication in the perpetuation of social representations 
highlights two important issues that have received scholarly attention over the years. 
Firstly, with the integration of new ideas into existing social representations, the 
content and form of social representations may change over time. Central Nucleus 
Theory has distinguished between the core and periphery components of social 
representations. The core of a social representation is its central component and 
defines the social representation as well as its reason for existence. The peripheral 
component of a social representation consists of beliefs, ideas and stereotypes that 
serve to make the social representation relevant and applicable to a particular milieu. 
Peripheral ideas are amenable to change and they help in making the social 
representation adaptable to changing social realities (Abric, 2001; also Moliner & 
Abric, this volume). Sammut, Tsirogianni & Wagoner (2012) propose that 
communication enables social representations to evolve over time in the manner of an 
epidemiological time-series.  As such, a historical focus may make manifest the core 
and peripheral elements of a social representation over the course of time. In this 
light, understanding social representations may necessitate exploring the historical 
trajectory of a representational project. Through collective remembering, the past 
exercises an influence on present social relations through the content available in 
social representations in circulation at a given historical epoch.  
This brings us to the second focal point concerning the role of communication, 
that is, intergroup and interpersonal relations. Duveen (2008) argued that 
communicative strategies serve to not only perpetuate social representations, they also 
serve to forge affiliative ties amongst group members. Duveen argued that 
propaganda serves to develop solidarity between group members. Such groups come 
to share a political commitment and are distinguishable from out-group members who 
do not share the same ideology. Propagation serves in developing communion. 
Founded on belief, the social representation serves to mark outgroup members, i.e. 
those who do not similarly believe, or those whose political ideology is incompatible 
with the group’s beliefs. Lastly, diffusion serves in developing sympathy. This is 
characterised by the voluntary association of individuals who stand in contrast to 
dogmatic outgroups. One way that these affiliative bonds are put in place is through 
alternative representations (Gillespie, 2008). This term refers to that component of a 
social representation that describes what others who do not subscribe to the same 
social representation are like. Alternative representations, such as, for example, that a 
particular outgroup may be closed-minded or ignorant, serve to put in place semantic 
barriers that limit dialogue with outgroup members (Gillespie, 2008). This may often 
be perceived as a shortcoming in political agendas that seek reconciliation between 
different groups. However, such strategies remain highly effective in protecting a 
representation’s core, ensuring its survival over time, perpetuating affiliative bonds 
and social capital amongst group members that is already in place (Sammut, 
Andreouli & Sartawi, 2012), and strengthening the social identification of members 
with the group.  
A final issue that the role of communication has put on the social 
representations agenda concerns the socialization. Duveen and Lloyd (1990) argue 
that social representations are evoked in all forms of social interaction through the 
social identities asserted in individuals’ activities. They refer to this as the 
microgenetic process of social representations (see also Psaltis, this volume). It occurs 
firstly in the ways in which individuals construct their own understanding of the 
situation and locate themselves and others as social actors in social relations. 
Secondly, in instances of discord, the negotiation of social identities becomes explicit 
and identifiable in social interaction in a microgenetic process that serves to negotiate 
a shared frame of reference. Social representations, according to Duveen and Lloyd, 
furnish the resources for such negotiation.  
 
 
New directions 
 
Over the last fifty years, the social representations approach has flourished and this 
has led to numerous refinements and developments in understanding myriad social-
psychological phenomena. It has also attracted much criticism over thorny issues such 
as the role of cognition (Parker, 1987), the notion of what is shared in social 
representations (Verheggen & Baerveldt, 2007), the ambiguity of the terms and 
concepts utilised (Jahoda, 1988; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), as well as the meaning of 
the term social (Harré, 1988). Much of this criticism remains relevant today. 
Arguably, this has helped develop rather than dismantle the social representations 
approach, as scholars sought to refine their definitions, resolve inconsistencies, and 
reconcile certain notions with other schools of thought. Many of these ingredients are 
present in the chapters of this handbook.  Some issues are still debated, such as the 
difference between social representations and attitudes, the difference between 
individual representations and social representations, the impact of diversity in 
contemporary public spheres, and the way to define social groups and communities. 
Rather than avoid these questions, the authors in this handbook critically engage with 
the debates and propose ways of addressing the issues with the objective of 
strengthening the pragmatic potential of the social representations approach. 
Since Moscovici’s (2008[1961/1976]) original study concerning the social 
representations of psychoanalysis in France, much has been achieved. The social 
representations approach has developed into a coherent framework for the study of 
the evolution, structure and functions of common-sense, in its variability across socio-
cultural and socio-political contexts. The concept of social representations has come 
to serve the querying of mentalities and corollary issues that arise in the diversity of 
human behaviours across myriad contexts. More recently, it seeks to understand how 
this diversity is reconciled in social relations. Whether this effectively constitutes a 
paradigmatic shift is certainly debatable. Yet the social representations approach 
stands as a pillar amongst other approaches that have overcome the simplistic 
reductionism of behaviourism. It further adds a critical focus to the prevailing 
information-processing and nomothetic approaches to psychology. Robert Farr’s 
assessment of social representations theory is that it offers a conceptualization of 
human action that is context and culture specific, furnishing accounts of behaviour as 
it occurs in situ.  (Farr, 1996).  It is now recognized in many scholarly communities as 
a rival paradigm in social psychology; the revolution is gathering pace. 
 	  
